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R. Paul Nadin-Davis*

Justification for Residual
Criminal Stigmatization: A
Contribution to the Modern
Philosophy of Punishment

...Amnesty. Let's all forgive them for mistakes made long ago.
Nobody in our community ought to lose his civic rights.
Aristophanes, The Frogs.
I. Introduction
In the past twenty-five years advances in research have increased
awareness of the deleterious effects of criminal sanction to an extent
that they are now undeniable from any political or academic viewpoint. The most obvious and immediate unofficial sanction
accompanying conviction in a criminal court, social and familial
ostracism, has been relegated to the background by application of
subcultural theory' and empirical demonstration that a single
2
conviction rarely causes severe and lasting effects on family ties.
Meanwhile discrimination against ex-offenders in employment
markets, both private3 and public, 4 has been clearly demonstrated in
*Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professors Nigel D. Walker (Institute of Criminology, University of
Cambridge), Bruce Archibald and Leon Trakman (Dalhousie University) for useful
comments and criticisms. Views and errors are, however, those of the author alone.
1. J. B. Mays, Delinquency Areas-A Re-Assessment (1963), 3 Brit. J. Criminol.
216
2. J. P. Martin & D. Webster, The Social Consequences of Conviction 110 (1971)
conclude: "Generally speaking the pattern of relationship with the natal family was
little changed during the follow-up period. Such changes as occurred followed no
consistent pattern."
3. Experimental designs have demonstrated private sector stigmatization in real
situations: see W. Buikhuisen and P. H. Dijksterhuis, Delinquency and
Stigmatisation (1971), 11 Brit. J. Criminol. 185; R. Boshier and D. Johnson, Does
ConvictionAffect Employment Opportunities?(1974), 14 Brit. J. Criminol. 264; R.
D. Schwartz and J. H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma (1962), 10 Soc.
Prob. 133. A clear relationship between conviction and employment difficulties
was shown by G. Pownall, Employment Problems of Released Prisoners(1969).
The best questionnaire study of employer attitudes reported is J. P. Martin,
Offenders As Employees (1962)
4. John Melichercik of the Toronto School of Social Work concluded:
"Government, as administrator of penal institutions and parole, tries to induce
private employers to hire former offenders. But as employer, government (through
civil service) studiously avoids doing what it urges private enterprise to do."
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many countries. American writers have documented widely the loss
of civil rights and status of ex-offenders 5 and while there is good
reason for the United States to feel more guilty in respect of such
stigmatization - civil disabilities are considerably more prevalent
in the U.S.A. than elsewhere in the cpmmon law world - at least
one writer has pointed out that their neighbours across the 49th
parallel are far from innocent of such derogation of the ex-offender
status. 6 Old convictions can affect licence applications 7 and the
contractual,8 testatory 9 and immigration capacities 10 of the bearer.
While police science has highlighted the prejudice toward known
offenders that is prevalent in many police departments,"
Employment Problems of Former Offenders (1956), 2 N.P.P.A.J. 43. See further
H. S. Miller, The Closed Door: The Effect of a Criminal Record on Employment
With State andLocal PublicAgencies (1972)
5. The most comprehensive review is that of Grant et al., The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction (1970), 23 Vt. L. Rev. 929. See further R.
A. Bryan, Criminals' Loss of Civil Rights (1963), 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 328;
Comment, Civil Disabilitiesof Felons (1967), 53 Va. L. Rev. 403; W. W. May
and L. F. Sword, New Approaches to the Civil Disabilitiesof Ex-Offenders (1975),
64 Ky. L. J. 382. On political rights especially see H. Itzkowitz and K. Oldak,
Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote: Background andDevelopments (1973),
11 Am. Cr. Law Rev. 721; Comment, The Ex-Convict's Right to Vote (1967), 40

S. Calif. L. Rev. 148
6. H.R.S. Ryan, Loss of Civil and PoliticalRights on Conviction of a Criminal
Offence (1963), 5 Crim. L.Q. 470
7. J. W. Hunt, J. E. Bowers and N. Miller, Laws, Licenses and the Offender's
Right to Work 29-41 (In American Bar Association National Clearinghouse on
Offender Employment Restrictions, Removing Offender Employment Restrictions

(1976)) lists no less than 306 occupations from which a person in the U.S.A. may
be excluded on the basis of an old conviction. Canadian legislation is in general not
so comprehensive, although many professions require "good character", and
licensing for certain businesses (particularly liquor licences) may be denied to
ex-offenders.
8. See for example Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970 c.C-34, s. 682(3). In
the U.S.A. four "civil death" statutes expressly remove contractual capacity. See
Grant et'al., supra, note 5, 1030-37
9. For details of U.S. law on admissibility of convictions in evidence see Grant et
al., supra, note 5, 1037-50, and Note, To Take the Stand orNot To Take the Stand:
The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record (1968), 4 Colum. J. L. &
Soc. Prob. 215. Canadian law allows admission of an accused's previous
convictions against his credit: Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970 c. E-10, s. 12(1).
See further E.L. Teed, Effect of s.12 of the CanadaEvidence Act UponAn Accused
(1971), 13 Crim. L.Q. 70. English law is not so severe: see generally R. Cross and
N. Wilkins, An Outline ofthe Law of Evidence (1975)
10. For Canada, see Immigration Act 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c.52, s. 19; for
England, see Immigration Rules: Control on Entry; for the U.S.A., see
Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C.A., s. 482(a)(9)(10)
11. Police use of records has been found to prejudice the ex-offender in several
situations, including: surveillance of "known" criminals (M. R. Damaska,
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sociological theory has demonstrated the danger that a person once
'labelled' a criminal will develop a self-concept which leads to
further criminal activity.12 It goes almost without saying that the
continued existence of various prejudices in the ex-offender's
environment may contribute heavily to this process.
The major modern sources of this lasting or residual stigma are
technological-principally the electronic data bank and the mass
media. One writer has coined the phrase "record prison" to
describe the habitat of today's ex-offender.1 3 It is indeed to records,
official and unofficial that reform has been directed in the shape of
"expungement",' 14 record sealing, 15 or the "spending of
convictions". 1 6 However, these devices in the main, and
particularly in Britain and Canada, operate only when the
record-bearer has demonstrated his comparative lack of need for
such relief by a long period of crime-free life. There are, too, grave
Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A Comparative
Study (Part 2) (1969), 59 J. Crim. L., Criminol. & Pol. Sei. 542; 3. Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Justice Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice (1960), 69 Yale L. J. 543, 570f);
compulsory registration of felons (Note, CriminalRegistrationOrdinances:Police
Control over Potential Recidivists (1954), 103 U. Penn. L. Rev. 60); in field
interaction, interrogation and detection, including the discretion to arrest (W.
LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody 149 (1965); R. C.
Smith et al., Background Information: Does It Affect the Misdemeanor Arrest?
(1976), 4 J. Pol. Sci. Admin. 111); as primer material for interrogation (R. E.
Clift, A Guide to Modern Police Thinking (1965)); "dragnet" arrests (LaFave,
supra, at 288); and modus operandiinvestigations (see e.g. R. Morrish, The Police
and Crime DetectionToday (1959)).
12. For the major theoretical expositions of this theme see H. S. Becker,
Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963); E. H. Lemert, Social
Pathology (1951) and Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control
(1967). Recent empirical support has been given to this position by M. Gold,
Delinquent Behavior in an American City (1970); M. Gold and J. R. Williams,
NationalStudy of the Aftermath ofApprehension (1969), 3 Prospectus-A. J. of L.
Reform 3; M. W. Klein, Labelling,Deterrence andRecidivism: A Study of Police
Dispositions (1974), 22 Soc. Prob. 292; and especially D. P. Farrington, The
Effects of PublicLabelling (1977), 19 Brit. J. Criminol. 112, and D. P. Farrington,
S. G. Osborn and D. J. West, The Persistenceof Labelling Effects (1978), 18 Brit.
J. Criminol. 277
13. J. T. DeWeese, Reforming Our "Record Prisons": A Proposal for the
FederalRegulation of Crime DataBanks (1974), 6 Rut-Cam. L. J. 27
14. This generic term is often used to describe a range of American measures. For
a detailed survey see A. R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of
Juvenile andAdult Offenders: A Problem of Status, [1966] Wash. U.L.Q. 147
15. For example under the Canadian Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 12
(1st. Supp.)
16. For example under the British Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, c. 53
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problems in the dissemination of such relief- in Britain spending of
convictions is available only to those sentenced to thirty months of
imprisonment, or less; 17 in Canada, a requirement for an application
by the ex-offender18 and an investigation of his conduct and
circumstances by the National Parole Board'9 ensures that granting
of "pardons" will be to a very small number of ex-offenders each
year.

20

In short, the penal systems of today, more than ever before, cause
increased suffering to the offender, far beyond that imposed in the
official penalty of the sentencing agent. The purpose of this paper is
to examine the possibility of justification of such extensive
stigmatization, in the light of the traditional theories of punishment,
and their conceptions of the role of the penal system. Should there
be no justification available, appreciable reforms in the structure of
the present-day penal process will be needed in order to modify
unofficial stigmatization to a form reconcilable with rational notions
of justice. Anticipating the result of the inquiry, such reforms might
well include decriminalization of those offences which, while
serious enough to merit judicial sanction, are not serious enough to
incur the full sanction of penal stigmatization. 2 ' They might also
include some limitation on the traditional freedom of the press to
report names of petty offenders, 22 and indeed a modification of data
systems away from the present trend to centralization. Also
17. Id., s. 5
18. CriminalRecords Act, s. 4(1)
19. Id., s.4(2)
20. I.e. slightly more than 2200perannum, average 1970-78
21. See generally Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our CriminalLaw (1976)
(recommendation for reduction of scope of criminal law to "core" offences); La
Dicriminalisation, actes du 3 Colloque international, Bellagio, 7-12 mai 1973,

Centre nazionale di prevenzione e difesa Sociale (1975) (general papers). On
decriminalization of an area of behaviour see e.g. D. Cruickshank, Alternatives to
the Judicial Process: Court Avoidance in Child Neglect Cases (1978),

12

U.B.C.L. Rev. 248. On decriminalization of a specific offence, see United States
Congress Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Decriminalizationof
Marijuana(1977)
22. For discussion of the conflicting arguments regarding full publication of details

of criminal cases see G. Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings(1958), 4
N.P.P.A. J. 333; G. Geis, Identifying Delinquents in the Press (1965), 29 Fed.
Prob. 44; G. Geis, The Case of Rape: Legal Restrictions on Media Coverage of
Deviance in England and America, in C. Winick, Mass Media and Deviance
(1978); M. Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal
Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact (1963), 16 Stan. L. Rev. 107; J. McKeever,
Publication of True Information on the Public Record (1976), 14 Duquesne L.
Rev. 507

562 The Dalhousie Law Journal

involved in any scheme of reform must be alternatives to the
traditional penal process: not least, diversion. 2 3 The details of
innovation are, however, best left to the draughtsmen of any
proposed new system; the object here is merely to develop a
comprehensive theoretical scheme by which such advances may be
justified.
II. The Application of TraditionalPunitivePhilosophies
Justifying philosophies are well known in the study of punishment;
the traditional standpoints have distinguished pedigrees to which
reference will be made below. The disadvantages suffered by
ex-offenders as a result of conviction, be they imposed by persons
or institutions, are clearly punitive in nature in that they are
sufferings in themselves, and flow from conviction for a crime. For
this reason, discussion regarding the justification of their existence
can be fitted into the framework of the traditional theories of
punishment. Logically, if the residual effects are an adjunct of the
official process then both must be judged by the same criteria.
If the alternative view is taken, namely that the collateral
consequences of conviction are not, in reality, a part of the direct
sentence, but are a distinct penalty, then they require separate
reasons for justification. An argument for the requirement of
justification of deprivation of prisoner's rights recently advanced by
Mandel, also lends itself well to post-sentence stigmatization:
In the first place, and most directly,

.

.

. prisoners

are

deliberately made substantially worse off than non-prisoners in
addition to enforced residence in a prison for a number of years.
It is always wrong to deliberately inflict (sic) suffering upon
human beings, a fortiori upon some but not others, unless there
are good reasons to justify the practice.
The second set of reasons for requiring some justification for the
deprivations stem (sic) in part from the undisputable fact the
prisoners are drawn, for the most part and to a disproportionate
extent, from the relatively powerless and deprived classes ....
This renders even more initially unacceptable the additional
deprivations heaped upon them . . especially where these
deprivations also enhance their powerlessness . . . Furthermore,

there are serious ramifications for the class from which prisoners
are primarily drawn and, thereby, for society at large. To the
extent that deprivations materially enhance prisoners' isolation
23. See especially Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper #7,
Diversion (1974)
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from the rest of society and are supported by or themselves
engender the notion that prisoners deserve less than other
members of their class because they are fundamentally different,
lesser human beings, these deprivations will serve to obscure the
relationship of the sub-class to the class from which it is drawn.
This carries with it the danger that, in so far as imprisonment can
be viewed as an added dimension of class inequality, or even as a
means of perpetuating class inequality, this function will be
disguised. Put another way, in so far as criminality stems from
social and not individual pathology, this fact may be obscured by
the stigmatizing, isolating and power-draining 2 4deprivations
which are inflicted on prisoners [footnotes omitted].
Whether residual stigmatization is viewed as a part of the official
penalty or a distinct entity, therefore, a justifying rationale is
required. In either event, the scheme of justification developed in
relation to the direct penalty encompasses the majority of arguments
which may be raised in evaluation of residual stigmatization.
III. The Theories Applied
Commentators on the penal system and on justification of its
sanctions, although possibly susceptible of allocation to distinct
schools, are rarely in precise agreement as to the justification for, or
aims of, a sentencing system. The continuing debate upon the
justification of punishment is too long and involved for full
discussion here; briefly, however, there are traditionally two lines
of argument - retributive and utilitarian. 2 5 The former is the older,
and in many respects less complex. Retributivism suffered many
years of desuetude as a result of the rise of utilitarianism in the late
nineteenth century. 26 Of late, disillusionment with utilitarian aims
24. M. Mandel, The Philosophy of Prisoners' Rights, in B. C. Hoffley, L. J.
Cohen and J. Nuffield, A Working PaperRelating to the Protectionof the Rights of
PersonsConfined in PenalInstitutions(1977)
25. A condensed and useful description is J.M.P. Weiler, Why Do We Punish?
The Casefor RetributiveJustice (1978), 12 U.B.C.L. Rev. 295, at 295-3 10
26. Retributivism is still unpopular as the sole justifying aim amongst modem
philosophers. The two main reasons appear to be the tendency to regard criminal
acts as a product of environment, circumstances, etc., rather than as a wilful act of
an individual making a free choice (although the judiciary still seem to find favour
with a view of crime as a voluntary act - see for example R. v. Beaver Creek
CorrectionalCamp Head ex. p. McCaud (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.):
"It is strictly correct to say that the confinement of an inmate in a penitentiary is the
result of a voluntary choice on his part."), and the realisation that the majority of
criminals come from the disadvantaged classes. Thus punishment does not redress
the balance between the offender and others but tends rather to weight it more
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has occasioned a swing of the pendulum back to retribution as a
27
popular rationale, with such eminent theorists as Herbert Packer
and Norval Morris 2 8 attempting to formulate an integrated theory of
punishment, essentially a compromise wherein no more punishment
may be inflicted than the least severe theory authorises in each case.
These philosophical theories will be dealt with in turn. Before
commencing the discussion, however, a preliminary distinction
may be drawn between the retrospective justification of punishment
- taking punishment as a fact and trying to justify it - and
prospective formulation of aims for the penal system. The
distinction is hazy, for while utilitarianism and retribution may
justify punishment, they may also be the aims of the system. A
notable exception is the thesis of the Spanish jurist Montero, which,
while being an aim of the penal system, does not justify punishment
in itself.2 9 Montero's principle, as condensed by Walker, is that one
aim of a penal system should be "to protect offenders and suspected
offenders from unofficial retaliation". 3o Walker suggests that most
people seeking to justify this aim would argue either (a) unofficial
retribution leads to further disorder, or (b) unofficial retaliation
often imposes excessive suffering on the offender, and he points out
that each of these justifications appeals to other theories of
punishment; reductivism in the first case, and retributive or
humanitarian limitations in the second. 3 ' It is not, however,
necessary to go to these lengths to remove the Montero principle
from the list of potential punishment-justifiers; his principle,
admittedly valid and almost universally accepted, is nothing more
than a justification for having punishment administered officially.
To justify the punishment which is inflicted it is not enough to say
heavily against him. See M.R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution - An
Examination of DoingJustice, [1976] Wisc. L. Rev. 781. This second criticism is
based on the presupposition that all men should be equal, and has thus been adopted
by Marxist critiques (see Gardner, supra). If one takes the position, rather, that the
role of punishment is to put a person back in the place he started from, so that his
crime does not give him an unfair lead over similarly placed competitors, the
criticism falls.
27. The Limits of the CriminalSanction (1968)
28. The Future of lmprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy (1974), 72 Mich.
L. Rev. 1161
29. ElDerechoProtectorde los Criminales (1916)
30. Sentencing in a Rational Society 17 (1969). Sir James Stephen stated the
principle more picturesquely: "The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in
much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite." QuoDted in Weiler,
supra, note 25, at 308
31. Ibid.
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that otherwise someone else would do it; one needs to look deeper to
justify deliberate infliction of harm upon the offender.
It is a worthwhile exercise, however, to examine the implications
of Montero's aim for the discussion at hand. Montero was not
concerned with the unofficial side-effects of conviction; rather his
argument was directed to the direct sentence of the judicial organ, in
preference to the lynch-mob. No doubt he had in mind that the
history of the criminal law begins with a take-over by the state of
retaliatory powers, in pursuance of a better ordering of society (or
increased revenues). But if Montero had directed his mind to the
residual stigma discussed herein, he might very well have been
disappointed with the penal systems of the western world today. If a
principal aim of the penal system is to displace unofficial
retaliation, then we fail Montero miserably in respect of the
after-effects of conviction.
In essence, then, we already have a reason for reducing unofficial
stigma. The paradox is that in our modern sentencing process,
official sentence may be reduced on account of other hardships
32
suffered by the offender or his family.
(a) Retributive Justifications
Retributive theory appears in a number of more or less sophisticated
forms; central is the notion that offenders deserve punishment
because they have committed a crime. 3 Many proponents of this
theory appeal to religious or moral values as an underlying
34
motivation.
This simple form of retributivism does not have specific reference
to the application of extra-legal stigma. Where retribution is used as
a limiting principle, however, clear consequences arise. Professor
Hart has coined the phrase "retribution in distribution" to describe
the limiting notion that penalties should be inflicted only on those
32. R. v. Nash (1949), 94 C.C.C. 356 at 358 (N.B.S.C.): "In determining the
appropriate sentence [the trial judge] must consider ... any extenuating
circumstances which may appear from the evidence." See further R. v. Kangles
(1960), 129 C.C.C. 138 (Sask. C.A.), where a defendant's "blemish to his name
and indirectly to his wife and family" was held to be relevant to reduction of
sentence for obtaining money by false pretences.
33. I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 102 (1965, Ladd trans.). The
notion of desert is ably analysed in A. Von Hirsch, Doing Justice, ch. VI. (1976).
Von Hirsch concludes that desert and deterrence are also mutally interdependent.
34. H. Jones, Crime andthe PenalSystem, 3rd. ed. 135 (1965)
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found guilty of crime. 35 Here is a clear cause for censure of
stigmatization visited upon those merely arrested, tried and
acquitted, or stigmatized due to non-defendant involvement with the
trial process.
Secondly, a similarly sophisticated form of retribution is that
which attempts to fix the severity of the penalty in relation to the
crime committed. 3 6 Immanuel Kant is the most noted historical
exponent of this view:
What kind of degree of punishment does public legal justice
adopt as its principle and standard? None other than the principle
of equality (illustrated by the pointer on the scales of justice), that
is, the principle of not treating one side more favourably than the
other. Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on
someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself. If
you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you
steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself. Only the
can determine exactly the kind
law of retribution (jus talionis)
37
and degree of punishment.
Again the implications of the position for a theory of residual
stigmatization are clear; if retribution were required, it would take a
considerable increase in the sophistication of sentencing in modern
courts to take account of all unofficial suffering before fixing the
official penalty. Suppose the crime were a theft of $10. Defendant
A is an unemployed man with 20 previous convictions for
dishonesty. Defendant B is a warehouse manager who will lose his
job if his bond is revoked. Is it at all possible to impose an official
penalty which would balance the scales of disadvantage equally
against each one? Presumably only an extremely severe penalty
would do equal harm to defendant A as would the mere fact of
conviction to defendant B. The alternative is of course to attempt to
minimise unofficial stigmatization.
Before leaving retributive theory, it is also worthwhile to
consider a related view of punishment, into which retribution often
merges - the "expiatory" justification. 38 This theory, exemplified
in Christian teachings by Jesus' paying the debt for the sins of man
upon the Cross, essentially holds that punishment is the purging of
35. Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, PresidentialAddress to the
AristotelianSociety (1956). [1959-60] Aristotelian Soc., Proceedings
36. It is almost trite to point out that the Canadian Criminal Code, for example,
fixes sentencing maxima with considerable reference to this principle.
37. Supra, note 33.
38. See, for example, B. J. Cavanaugh, The Justification of Punishment (1978),
16 Alta. L. Rev. 43, at 46
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the guilt of the offender. If serving the official penalty purges guilt,
then the imposition of any further disability or prejudice is not
justifiable on this basis. One cannot however look to the expiatory
theory for consistency; one might note in passing the paradox of
much religious discussion of retribution that, while holding that
man will atone for his wrongs before God would seem to imply that
the man who does not repent should not be punished on earth. To do
so would be to expose him to double account for his sins!
Presumably religious theorists would also argue against a man
having to suffer twice for the same crime, and for more lenient
treatment of repentant criminals.39
Retributive principles, at least where delimiting in distribution or
severity of sentence, have much to offer to the debate on residual
stigmatization. Utilitarian theories and aims, likewise, have clear
implications for stigmatizing practices.
(b) UtilitarianJustifications
The essence of utilitarian theory is an attempt to justify punishment
in terms of the general benefits to mankind. Rather than focussing
on the individual offender and act, the utilitarian seeks to improve
the common lot by visiting a lesser harm on the individual. In
sophisticated utilitarian theory, the principle "it is better that one
man die than that the whole state perish" is mitigated by
considerations of desert in the allocation of penalties. Bentham, the
father of utilitarianism, wrote as follows:
That punishment which considered in itself appeared base and
repugnant to all generous sentiments is elevated to the first rank
of benefits when it is regarded not as an act of wrath or vengeance
against a guilty or unfortunate individual who has given way to
but as an indispensable sacrifice to the
mischievous inclinations,
40
common safety.
In practice one suspects that the impressive logic of utilitarianism
gives way to a general desire to reduce crime, particularly where
39. Of course the sentencing process already accommodates this last principle. A
guilty plea, seen as a confession of the wrongness of the act and therefore as the
irst step on the road to rehabilitation, is a recognised (though unwritten) ground of
leniency in sentencing. It is greatly used to the defendant's advantage in bargaining
with prosecutors: see R. 0. Dawson, Sentencing 173 at 179-181 (1969); J. Baldwin
and M. McConville, Negotiated Justice (1977). In Chinese law the principle
"Leniency to those who confess and severity to those who resist" is of central
importance. See R. Edwards, Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with
4ppendedSentencingDocuments (1977), 16 Colum. J. Trans. L. 45 at 57-58
40. PrinciplesofPenalLaw 396
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reported incidence rates are rising, because it is a political
embarrassment. Whether this crude aim or the pure utilitarian base
is relied upon, several operative mechanisms may be called in aid.
(i) GeneralDeterrence
General-deterrent theory relies upon the notion that the imposition
of penalties upon those who transgress the legal norms of a society
will put others in fear of the consequences of a similar
transgression. Traditionally emphasis was laid upon fear of the
official penalty, although of late much research has suggested that
the severity or leniency of the official penalty has little effect upon
the decision to offend. Apparently most offenders operate on at least
a tentative assumption that they will not be caught. However,
modification of the offender's perception of the likelihood of being
caught (for example, by the widely publicized introduction of
roadside breathalyser testing for blood-alcohol levels of drivers)
seemingly does affect the rate of commission of non-emotional
41
crimes.
This finding has interesting implications for the theory of residual
stigmatization. If, on the one hand, however severe the possible
penalty (including unofficial stigma) might be, certain persons will
still offend, then there is no case for permitting degrading or
defamatory consequences to flow from conviction on the basis of
deterrence. On the other hand, it may be that a significant
proportion of those who do not offend (in the case of most crimes,
perhaps the large majority of the population) behave in a
conforming manner either due to their own morality (in which case
a penalty will not modify behaviour) or because of fear of the
unofficial consequences. If I consider the commission of some
minor crime, I might consider the possible court appearance, fine,
or probation, a minor inconvenience. But the shame and indignity I
might feel were my parents, wife and colleagues to know of the
conviction would be of a different order. That is not to mention
possible professional disadvantages that might be generated.
This personal notion is given considerable support in a wider
context by Willcock's and Stokes' study of deterrents and incentives
to crime amongst 808 English youths in the crime-prone age of 15 to
41. See for example Walker, supra, note 30, ch. 4. A review of the studies which
lead to this conclusion is contained in R. P. Davis, General Deterrence and
"Petty" Crime (1979), 143 Justice of the Peace 117
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21 years. 42 Subjects were asked to rank eight consequences of
"being found out by the police" according to "Which would worry
you most?" It is highly significant that the official penalty, on
average, rated fourth. The three replies ranked above it were all
based on unofficial consequences: "What my family would think",
"The chances of losing my job" (even more significantly, those
who had no job or were still at school were asked to rate "The
chances it would make it difficult to get the sort of job I want"), and
thirdly, "Publicity or shame of having to appear in court". Thus it
would appear that to remove trial publicity may detract substantially
from the general-deterrent effects of criminal process.
Buikhuisen's study of deterrence on car-tire offenders in the
Netherlands 43 suggested that three distinct groups may be discerned
in the population at large, namely,
a) "Undeterrables"
b) Those who would not offend whatever the penalty, and
c) Those who might be swayed by the likelihood of apprehension
or penalty.
The existence of two of these groups, a) and b), may apparently be
generalized to most crimes, and although it seems that the size of
group c) might decrease significantly as the moral or social severity
of a crime increases (hence the negative findings of studies on
forcible rape and murder 4 4), the existence of that group in minor
crime terms presents a possible utility for the added stigmatic effect
of post-conviction disabilities. In addition, it may be that unofficial
consequences are those most feared by persons who do not offend at
all despite increases or decreases in the official penalty.
A penal system based on general deterrence may thus justify loss
of civil abilities, encouragement of social ostracism by publication
of offenders' names and details of their trials and offence, and
42. H. D. Willcock and J. Stokes, Deterrents and Incentives to Crime Among
Youths Aged 15-21 Years, Vol II, Table 44 (1963)
43. General Deterrence: Research and Theory (1974), 14 Abs. Criminol. &
Penol. 285
44. See for example B. Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphiaof Pennsylvania's
Increased Penalties for Rape and Attempted Rape (1968), 59 J. Crim. L.,
Criminol. & Pol. Sci. 509. The literature on general deterrence of homicide is
immense. Walker (supra, note 30, at 81) concludes that: "Neither the New
Zealand nor the American data support the hypothesis that, as a deterrent, capital
punishment is more effective than... long periods of imprisonment." J. Ehrlich,
however, has recently produced a paper arguing the opposite: The DeterrentEffect
of CapitalPunishment:A Question ofLife andDeath, [19751 Am. Econ. Rev. 397
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indeed employment discrimination against ex-offenders. The
theorist relying solely on general deterrence, however, must be
prepared to accept other social costs of stigmatization upon those
two groups of the population on whom deterrence is not operative,
and may in the end achieve greater deterrence of a small group at the
expense of increased criminality of a larger group. Penal research is
not yet in a state to verify or disprove this prospect, but the very real
possibilities have been widely canvassed and are rapidly approach45
ing empirical verification.
(ii) IndividualDeterrence
Less research is available on this topic; it is often difficult to know
whether an offender who does not repeat is deterred or reformed.
The central notion of individual deterrence is of putting the
once-convicted individual in fear of the consequences of his own
re-offending. Many of the findings of general deterrence may,
however, be applied to this concept. The common assumption that
man calculates and rationalizes his actions means, firstly, that the
less emotional the crime, the more likelihood there is of effective
deterrence, and secondly, that manipulation of the offender's
perception of the likelihood of being caught is more likely to yield
results than manipulation of the official penalty. 46 In this light it is
pertinent to argue for the continuation of one type of stigmatization
-

police watchfulness -

provided that the offender can be made to

feel that he is more likely to be caught should he reoffend. Any
usefulness of such an approach would, however, be wasted should
other deprivations of civil abilities, in particular employment, be
such that the offender is forced into a situation where he feels that he
has no choice but to reoffend, despite the increased risk of
apprehension. Likewise, if police attention is of such a nature that
the offender's civil liberty is abrogated substantially, there is a
danger of the development of an "antilabeller" reaction which
would cancel out any benefits to be obtained.
(iii) Rehabilitation
Undoubtedly the most popular approach to penal philosophy of
recent years, the rehabilitative ethic, is losing much of its charm.
Detailed criminological research has suggested the failure of most if
45. See generally supra, note 12 and accompanying text

46. Supra, note 41 and accompanying text
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not all known methods of "treating" criminals to reduce offending
behaviour. 47 As a justification for punishment, reformation is
theoretically secure provided that a treatment can be shown to work;
however, in the absence of demonstrable results the idea of
punishment as reformation becomes a myth no longer justifiable by
the notion of "being cruel to be kind". It is beyond the scope of the
present discussion to outline the evidence referred to; this has been
adequately gathered elsewhere. 4 8 Instead, let us assume for the
moment that in some way official penalties could be devised which
reform the ex-offender. What then are the implications of adherence
to a rehabilitative philosophy for unofficial stigmatization?
The case has been most convincingly argued by Aaron Nussbaum
in his influential book, A Second Chance.4 9 Nussbaum argues that
the bulk of crime is the work of comparatively few serious
recidivists. Crime would be curtailed drastically, he argues, if the
first offender were given positive assistance in his reformation after
sentence. The mechanics of Nussbaum's proposals need not
concern us here; rather it is his account of the commencement of the
cycle of recidivism which is of value. On his return to society, the
debt apparently paid, the offender (in the U.S.A.) is faced with an
array of disabilities, prejudices and suspicions. His successful
reintegration into society is precluded by these bars.
No matter how genuine a reformation the ex-offender may have
achieved, or how earnest his quest for rehabilitation, he will
remain a prisoner of his criminal record throughout his days. 50
Nussbaum's thesis is equally valid for other countries and
cultures. A system genuinely rooted in a rehabilitative quest would
seek to minimize post-sentence stigmatization. Might it not be,
indeed, that residual stigmatization has played a large part in the
failure of experimental correctional regimes which might otherwise
have succeeded? If all offenders, no matter what their treatment
"inside", face the same bleak prospects once released, the failure
47. See, for a useful review, R. Hood and D. Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology
(1970)
48. Id.
49. The argument is summarised in a review by J. Karp in (1975), 42 Brooklyn L.

Rev. 408
50. Nussbaum, op. cit. (1974) 4. The argument is not new: R. G. Ingersoll,
writing his Crimes Against Criminals in the nineteenth century (publ. posth. 1906)

averred that: "There is no reformation in degradation. To mutilate a criminal is to
iay to all the world that he is a criminal, and to render his reformation substantially

impossible." (at 21)
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to reform may be attributable to precisely that unofficial prejudice
visited upon the offender.
The sociological notion of labelling discussed above provides a
social-psychological insight into possible mental processes emphasized by residual stigmatization. Nussbaum's explanation that
the offender who is deprived of job opportunities, licences, permits
and the like, may as a consequence return to crime, would be refined
by the labelling theorist. The offender denied such opportunities is
encouraged to change his self-concept to that of "deviant" on
conviction; residual stigmatization assists him in maintaining that
self-image. Whether one subscribes to Nussbaum's straightforward
approach or prefers to examine the perceptual effect on the offender
the result is the same: a policy based on rehabilitation cannot
tolerate the imposition of residual stigmatization upon the
ex-offender.
(iv) Incapacitation
Within the general head of utilitarianism, subject to the
all-pervading rule of maximizing benefit, a policy of incapacitation
may be pursued. 5 1 The word has a sinister connotation, due no
doubt to its connections with the death sentence, castration and
mutilation. It has its place, too, in more enlightened penology. The
interditde s~jour, for example, which in France forbids an offender
from entering a certain locality, is a form of incapacitation, as is the
striking from the register of an embezzling accountant or lawyer
who misuses trust funds.
A qualified policy of incapacitation contributes to the theory of
residual stigmatization from both directions. The removal of the
embezzler from the field of temptation, if it involves debarring him
from a profession, is clearly the imposition of a disability,
justifiable if one aims to incapacitate. On the other hand, if
incapacitation were the only justification, then many other aspects
of residual stigmatization - in particular social ostracism and
police attentions - may not be justified. Further, a delimitation to
necessary incapacitation is consistent with an anti-discrimination
law which allows only offences relatedto the proposed employment
52
to be taken into consideration in a job application.
51. For a defence, see for example J. Q. Wilson, ThinkingAbout Crime (1975)
52. For example Hawaii Rev. Stats. s. 387-2 (Rep. 1976) which requires a
"substantial relationship to the functions and responsibilities of the prospective or
continued employment".
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With apologies for the inconsistency of this diversion, it seems
appropriate to discuss here the notion of incapacitation not in
isolation, as I have done with the previous heads, but in its real
setting. The justification for this approach is that while retribution
and deterrence may be envisaged realistically as forming the sole
basis of a reformed modern penal system, a policy of total
-ncapacitation of each and every offender may not, at least in
-ivilized countries. Probably only a 100% death penalty infliction
,vould achieve such an aim.
Incapacitation is, rather, the archetype of a balancing factor in
nodern penal philosophy. A man while he is imprisoned is
ncapacitated from many crimes (e.g. bank robbery, impaired
iriving, heterosexual rape) although others may be facilitated (e.g.
lomosexual rape, conspiracy). Similarly, bars on entry to
,rofessions are protective of the public interest. The dilemma of
iow long a man's record should be weighed against him is often
,oised most acutely in relation to protection of innocent individuals;
iow long should it be, for example, before a man convicted of
,ederasty should be allowed to teach at a school? Here the potential
iarm is viewed as extremely serious, thus even a slight risk may be
injustifiable. Other principles, for example limiting retributivism,
end to intervene lower down the scale, and thus we restore a
lriving licence to the man convicted of impaired driving after his
lisqualification. The risk may be as high or higher but the potential
iarm is viewed as less serious. Seriousness of possible harm
;overns not only the type of deprivations which may be placed upon
in ex-offender but also their duration. Long-term follow-up studies
)f such serious offenders as rapists and arsonists indicate that they
nay be more likely than the average member of the public to
ommit those offences for more than twenty years after a first
onviction. 53 In this light, the powerful press lobby on behalf of the
ublic's "right to know", which was so successful in defeating
4ew York's Amnesty Bills, may find some considerable
54
ustification.
It is thus open to conclusion that a policy of selective
ncapacitation (the greatest practical role of incapacitation) will
3, K. L. Soothill and P. Pope, Arson -A 22-year CohortStudy (1973), 13 Med.
ci. & The Law 127; K. L. Soothill, A. Jack and T.C.N. Gibbens, Rape - A
'wenty-Year CohortStudy (1976), 16 Med. Sci. & The Law 62.
4. For an account see A. Nussbaum, A Second Chance (1974)
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admit of a limited number of post-conviction difficulties being
imposed on the offender, including employment disabilities.
(c) EducationandDenunciation
A concept recently brought into favour is the idea that the
imposition of penalties is society's way of saying "what it thinks"
of a certain item of behaviour. 55 No one seems to have suggested
that this is done for its own sake; indeed Walker has suggested that
where a denunciatory theory is proposed it tends to be retribution by
another name. 56 It may also be reductivism, if the intention is that
the public shall be educated thereby to think badly of crime, and
therefore refrain from its commission.
There are a small group of related suggestions, none of them fully
explored, which appear relevant to this discussion. One proposal
generally mooted in the context of general deterrence, although
clearly not a form of deterrence, is that the imposition of penalties
has a long-term educative effect on a population in that its members
come to believe the behaviour morally wrong. Durkheim, in similar
vein, argued that:
Crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates
them. We have only to notice what happens, particularly in a
small town, when some moral scandal has been committed. They
stop each other on the street, they visit each other, they seek to
come together, to talk of the event and wax indignant in
common. From all the similar impressions which are exchanged,
there emerges a unique temper, . . which is everybody's
without 57being anybody's in particular. That is the public
temper.
The point has been echoed by Coser 5 8 and Erikson. 5 9 However, it is
at times unclear whether this "latent function" of deviance is based
on public punishment of the criminal, public censure of the
criminal, or public censure of the crime. Whichever it may be, it is
doubtful that the beneficial effects of public censure are greatly
enhanced by allowing continued stigmatization of the offender;
55. See, for example, J. D. Morton, The Function of Criminal Law in 1962
(1963). An exceptionally clear articulation of the position by Judge Roden
appeared as Sentencing: One Judge's Viewpoint, in Sydney Institute of
Criminology, Proceedingsofa Seminar on Sentencing (No. 35) 43 (1978)
56. Supra, note 30 at 24
57. The Division ofLabour in Society 102 (Simpson trans. 1960 C. 1933).
58. The Functionsof Social Conflict ch. 2 (1956).
59. Wayward Puritans:A Study in the Sociology ofDeviance (1966).
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indeed, this may even work counterproductively by bringing into
disrepute the very system which imposed the official penalty. The
philosophy of denunciation, however, applied more to the
pronouncement of the penalty than to its consequences, does not
hold implications for residual stigmatization as strong as those of
other theories.
IV. Social Motivationsfor Residual Stigmatization
In practice, no penal system adheres strictly to one philosophy;
elements of all the above rationales are meshed together, and a
penal system might aptly be termed "the outcome of politics and
chance".6O So too might our present practices toward ex-offenders.
The above discussion attempts to answer in the abstract the
question of why we could stigmatize. Some measures, particularly
civil death, are merely anachronistic remnants which in serious
debate might receive little support. Apart from those with specific
histories, stigmatic practices fall into two groups.
a) Protectionof the Stigmatizor
Examples include denial of employment and that social ostracism
which is determined by the consideration "I don't want my name
associated with criminals". A less obvious case is those practices
directed toward greater police efficiency; this is society, through its
agent, protecting itself from the potential future offender.
b) FurtherHurtingof the Offender
While self-interest and self-preservation are easily appreciated,
practices which seem calculated to do damage to the offender over
and above the official penalty merely because of his crime or status
are harder to explain. Social-psychological theory has thrown into
focus two suggestions to explain this phenomenon, which includes
social ostracism, unauthorised or unnecessary police brutality, and
quasi-judicial prejudice (for example, in licence applications where
the permission sought is unrelated to the nature of the offence).
The first suggestion is beautifully phrased by Erikson:
Moral indignation against deviants serves to purge the righteous
60. For an analysis of the role of politics in penal decision-making see R. P. Davis,
Party Orientations in Penal Policy (1978), 49 Polit. Q. 322. See further W. B.
Miller, Ideology and CriminalJustice Policy (1973), 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminol.
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from a sense of their own sins and unworthiness, and helps to
sustain their moral identity. . . it is against the ground of criminal
deviance that the righteous achieve the comforting affirmation of
their normality.61
This argument can be applied equally to the imposition of the
official penalty and subsequent stigmatization.
A second postulate was proposed by Rosemary Steadman-Allen
and myself, in a more specific context.6 2 Within the inmate
subculture in Britain and North America, those imprisoned for
molesting children are brutally stigmatized to the extent that they
generally have to be kept under special protection. The seemingly
unjust nature of their penalties (which tend to be fairly light in
comparison to, for example, embezzlement or large theft offences)
is often given by prisoners as the reason for this stigmatization.
Generalizing to the free community, might it not be that some
stigmatization is directed to enhancing the official penalty to an
extent commensurate with the stigmatizor's view of the desert of the
offender? 63 I have never heard anyone other than professionals in
the penal system, offenders and their families, and academic
commentators, complain that prison sentences are too long. The
general view of the proverbial man on the Clapham omnibus is
rather that "people get off too lightly".
V. Conclusion
Social-psychological explanations of reasons for stigmatization in
no way justify the practice. The remarkable observation which may
now be made is, rather, that in the light of the above discussion, in
our present state of knowledge, no theory of punishment presents a
tenable case for allowing residual effects to arise.64 The onus is on
61. Supra, note 59 at 4
62. R. P. Davis and R. J. Steadman-Allen, The Psychology of Rule 43 (1979),
34/2 Pris. Serv. J.
63. Miss Steadman-Allen and I suggested in relation to Rule 43, which provides
for protection by separate confinement of unpopular offenders, that stigmatization
of these offenders serves several purposes, not least of which is to reaffirm the
sexual normality of the other prisoners who are often seriously questioning their
own orientations due to prolonged heterosexual starvation and overexposure to
homosexual situations. We also considered that to some extent the dislike of
offenders against children, in particular, was merely an exaggerated reflection of an
attitude which would be found outside the prison, but was not as likely to be
concentrated in a relatively small group of people all with anti-social tendencies,
including propensities to violence.
64. See supra, note 12

Justification for Residual Criminal Stigmatization 577

the retributivist to devise a just system of accounting for residual
effects, if such is possible. If deterrence theory is called in aid, the
advocate must first reverse the trend in current research, which is
towards showing no justification for an assumption of deterrent
efficacy in increased penalties. If rehabilitation is our aim, the
degrading and defamatory effects of criminal process are a distinct
threat to our chances of success, and, if the theoretical scheme
developed by the "labelling theorists" is valid, may in fact be
counter-productive in large measure. Only a protective rationale has
any real claim to validity, although here again the long-term effects
of over-use of legal disadvantages may prove costly.
These arguments suggest that to view the criminal justice system
in a vacuum, as the mere imposition of an official penalty, is in the
face of modern technological developments more than ever before
an unrealistic and dangerous phenomenon. Above all they suggest
that the full effect of criminal process should be taken clearly into
account at all stages of the present sentencing system, and add great
weight to the Law Commission of Canada's plea for restraint in the
application of the criminal law. 6 5 While to evaluate the role of
residual stigmatization does not negate the value of a penal system
for all cases, it certainly adds with clarity a perspective on the
ever-increasing over-use of the criminal sanction.
65. See OurCriminalLaw, supra, note 21

